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Abstract
This article starts out with a detailed example illustrating the util-
ity of applying quantum probability to psychology. Then it describes
several alternative mathematical methods for mapping fundamental
quantum concepts (such as state preparation, measurement, state evo-
lution) to fundamental psychological concepts (such as stimulus, re-
sponse, information processing). For state preparation, we consider
both pure states and densities with mixtures. For measurement, we
consider projective measurements and positive operator valued mea-
surements. The advantages and disadvantages of each method with
respect to applications in psychology are discussed.
1 Why apply quantum theory to psychology?
Twenty years ago, a group of physicists and psychologists introduced the
bold idea of applying the abstract principles from quantum theory outside
of physics to the field of human judgment and decision making [5] [6] [7]
[8]. This new framework does not rely on the assumption that the brain is
some type of quantum computer, and instead it uses a probabilistic formula-
tion borrowed from quantum theory that involves non-commutative algebraic
principles [1] [2] [3][4]. This new field, called quantum cognition, has proved
to be able to account for puzzling behavioral phenomena that are found in
studies of a variety of human judgments and decisions including violations of
the “rational” principles of decision making [9], conjunction and disjunction
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probability judgment errors [10], over- and under- extension errors in concep-
tual combinations [11] [12], ambiguous concepts [13], order effects on proba-
bilistic inference [14] [15], interference of categorization on decision making
[16], attitude question order effects [17] and other puzzling results from de-
cision research [18] [19] [20] [21]. In short, quantum models of judgment and
decision have made impressive progress organizing and accounting for a wide
range of puzzling findings using a common set of principles.
1.1 Example: Categorization-decision experiment
To see more concretely how quantum theory can be applied to psychology,
consider the following psychology experiment used to investigate the inter-
ference of categorization on decision making. Often decision makers need to
make categorizations before choosing an action. For example, a military op-
erator has to categorize an agent as an enemy before attacking with a drone.
How does this overt report of the category affect the later decision? This
paradigm was originally designed to test a Markov model of decision mak-
ing that is popular in psychology [22]. Later it was adapted to investigate
“quantum like” interference effects in psychology [16].
We begin by briefly summarizing the methods used in the experiments.
On each trial of several hundred training trials, the participant is first shown
a picture of a face that may belong to a “good guy” category (category G)
or a “bad guy” category (category B), and they have to decide whether to
“attack” (action A) or “withdraw” (action W). The trial ends with feedback
indicating the category and appropriate action that was assigned to the face
on that trial. There are many different faces, and each face is probabilistically
assigned to a category, and the appropriate action is probabilistically depen-
dent on the category assignment. Some of the faces are usually assigned to
the “good guy” category, while other faces are usually assigned to the “bad
guy” category. The category is important because participants are usually
rewarded (win points worth money) for “attacking” faces assigned to “bad
guys” and they are usually punished (lose points worth money) for “attack-
ing” faces assigned to the “good guys;” likewise they are usually rewarded
for “withdrawing” from “good guys” and punished for “withdrawing” from
“bad guys.” Participants are given ample training during which they learn
to first categorize a face and then decide an action, and feedback is provided
on both the category and the decision. Although the feedback given at the
end of each trial is probabilistic, the optimal decision is to always “attack”
when the face is usually assigned to a “bad guy” category, and always “with-
draw” when the face is usually assigned to a “good guy” category. The key
manipulation occurs during a transfer test phase which includes the standard
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“categorization - decision” (C-D) trials followed by either “category alone”
(C-alone) trials or “decision alone” (D-alone) trials. For example, on a “de-
cision alone” trial, the person is shown a face, and simply decides to “attack”
or “withdraw,” and recieves feedback on the decision. The categorization of
the face on the D-alone trials remains just as important to the decision as
it is on C-D trials, and some implicit inference about the category is neces-
sary before making the decision, but the person does not overtly report this
implicit inference.
Note that the C-D condition in the psychology experiment allows the
experimenter to observe which “path” the participant follows before reach-
ing a final decision. This is analogous to a “double slit” physics experiment
in which the experimenter observes which “path” a particle follows before
reaching a final detector. In contrast, for the D-alone condition in the psy-
chology experiment, the experimenter does not observe which “path” the
decision maker follows before reaching a final decision. This is analogous
to the “double slit” physics experiment in which the experimenter does not
observe which “path” the particle follows before reaching a final detector.
According to the Markov model proposed in [22], for the D-alone condi-
tion, the person implicitly performs the same task as explicitly required by
the C-D condition. More specifically, for the D-alone condition, once a face
(denoted f) is presented, there is a probability that the person implicitly
categorizes the face as a “good” or “bad” guy. From each category inference
state, there is a probability of transiting to the “attack” or “withdraw” deci-
sion state. So the probablity of “attack” in the D-alone condition (denoted
as p(A|f)) should equal the total probability of “attacking” in the C-D con-
dition (denoted as pT (A|f)). The latter is defined by the probability that the
person categorizes a face as a “good guy” and then “attacks” plus the proba-
bility that the person categorizes the face as a “bad guy” and then “attacks”
(pT (A|f) = p(G ∩ A|f) + p(B ∩ A|f)). Using this categorization-decision
paradigm, one can examine how the overt report of the category interferes
with the subsequent decision. An interference effect of categorization on
decision making occurs when the probability of “attacking” for D-alone tri-
als differs from the total probability pooled across C-D trials. The Markov
model for this task originally investigated by [22] predicts that there should
be no interference, and the law of total probability should be satisfied.
Beginning with our first study [16], we have conducted a series of four
experiments on this paradigm. The results of these experiments all generally
show the same results, but we briefly report a summary of findings from the
fourth experiment that included 246 participants (a minimum 34 observations
per person per condition). When a face most likely is assigned to the “god
guy” category (we denote these faces as g), the law of total probability is
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approximately satisfied (pT (A|g) = .36, p(A|g) = .37). However, when a
face most likely is assigned to the “bad guy” category (we denote these faces
as b), the probability of “attack” (i.e. the optimal decision with respect
to the average payoff) is systematically greater for the D-alone condition
as compared to the C-D condition” violating the law of total probability
(p(A|b) = .62 > pT (A|b) = .56)
1. More surprising, the probability of “attack”
for the D-alone condition (which leaves the “good” or “bad” guy category
unresolved) was even greater than the probability of “attack” given that
the person previously categorized the face as a “bad guy” (p(A|b) = .62 >
p(A|b, B) = .61) on a C-D trial! For some reason, the overt categorization
response interfered with the decision by reducing the tendency to “attack”
faces that most likely belonged to the “bad guy” category. These violations
of the law of total probability run counter to the predictions of the Markov
model proposed by [22] for this task.
1.2 A Quantum decision model
The details of a quantum model for the categorization-decision task are pre-
sented in [16], and here we only present a brief summary. The human decision
system is represented by a unit length state vector |ψ〉 that lies within an
4-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by four basis vectors. Each basis vec-
tor represents one of the four combinations of categories and actions (e.g.,
|GA〉 is a basis vector corresponding to category G and action A). The state
|ψf 〉 = ψGA |GA〉 + ψGW |GW 〉+ ψBA |BA〉 + ψBW |BW 〉 is prepared by the
face stimulus f that is presented on a trial. The question about the cat-
egory is represented by a pair of projectors for good and bad categories
CG = |GA〉 〈GA| + |GW 〉 〈GW | , CB = (I − CG). The question about the
action is represented by a pair of projectors for attack and withdraw actions
DA = UDC |GA〉 〈GA|U
†
DC + UDC |BA〉 〈BA|U
†
DC , DW = (I −DA), where
UDC is a unitary operator that changes the basis from the categorization to
the decision basis.
The probability of first categorizing the face as a “bad guy” and then
“attacking” equals p(B,A|f) = p (B) · p (A|B) = ‖CB |ψf〉‖
2 · ‖DA |ψB〉‖
2,
with |ψB〉 =
CB|ψf〉
‖CB|ψf〉‖
, and combining the terms in the product we obtain
p(B,A|f) = ‖DA · CB · |ψf 〉‖
2; similarly, the probability of first categoriz-
ing the face as a “good guy” and then “attacking” equals p(G,A|f) =
‖DA · CG · |ψf〉‖
2; and so the total probability of attacking under the C-
1This difference are statistically significant: t(245) = 4.41, p = .0004. Also this same
effect was replicated in 4 independent experiments
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D condition equals pT (A|f) = ‖DA · CG · |ψf〉‖
2 + ‖DA · CB · |ψf 〉‖
2. The
probability of attack in the D-alone condition equals p(A|f) = ‖DA · |ψf 〉‖
2 =
‖DA · (CG + CB) |ψf 〉‖
2 = ‖DA · CG |ψf 〉+DA · CB |ψf 〉‖
2 = ‖DA · CG |ψf 〉‖
2
+ ‖DA · CB |ψf〉‖
2+ Int, where Int = 2 · Re [〈ψf |CGDACB|ψf 〉]. If the
projectors for categorization commute with the projectors for action (e.g.,
UDC = I), then the interference is zero, Int = 0, and we obtain p(A|f) =
‖DA · CG |ψf 〉‖
2 + ‖DA · CB |ψf 〉‖
2 = pT (A|f) , and the law of total probabil-
ity is satisfied. However, if the projectors do not commute (e.g., UDC 6= I),
then we obtain an interference term. We can select the unitary operator
UDC to produce an inner product Int = −.06, and account for the observed
violation of the law of total probability.
We originally conducted these experiments because we predicted that an
interference effect of categorization on decisions would occur based on past re-
search using quantum models of decision [23]. However, we could not predict
the direction or quantitative size of the interference. Now that we have this
estimate, we can use it to make new predictions for new experiments. Along
this line, we carried out a second condition in our fourth study to test our
model. During the transfer phase of the second condition, we included two
different types of transfer test trials: (a) D- alone trials as described earlier
in which the participant did not categorize but only made an action deci-
sion, and (b) trials on which we informed the participant about the correct
category and the person made an action decision. Note that for the second
condition (b), the participants did not make any categorization response and
only made a decision, but this decision was based on information provided
by the experimenter about the category. According to our theory, providing
information about the category produces the same effect as taking a mea-
surement of the category – if the person is told the face belongs to the “bad
guy category,” then the state is updated from |ψf 〉 to |ψB〉 =
CB|ψf〉
‖CB|ψf〉‖
in
the same way as if a measurement was made. Therefore, if we use the choice
probabilities from this second condition to compute the total probability,
then this second condition should produce exactly the same interference ef-
fect as the first. Supporting this prediction, the interference term for the
second condition equaled Int= -.05, which closely approximates the inter-
ference obtain from the first condition. The great challenge for quantum
cognition models is to use the same principles then to predict new findings
(e.g., see [17][24], further a priori tests of the theory).
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2 Step by Step application of quantum the-
ory to Psychology
How does one apply quantum principles to psychological experiments? How
are the stimuli and responses of a psychology experiment related to the state
preparation and measurements of quantum theory? How does one deter-
mine the observables, initial states, and unitary operators for psychology?
The above application involved several important assumptions regarding the
mapping of basic concepts in physics (e.g., state preparation, state evolution,
measurement operators) into basic concepts of psychology (e.g., stimuli, in-
formation processing, responses). The next sections examine these mappings
more carefully, explores different ways to formulate this mapping, and dis-
cusses the advantages and disadvantages of different mappings.
2.1 Choosing a Hilbert space
Both physicists and psychologists are faced with the scientific task of making
predictions about the probability that different kinds of events occur in their
experiments. For example the psychologist wants to predict whether a person
will “attack” or “withdraw” when a face is presented; a quantum physicist
wants to predict whether a particle is detected by one detector or another
after it is emitted from a source. Traditionally, psychologists have used
classic theory (axiomatized by Kolmogorov), whereas quantum physicists
use quantum theory (axiomatized by Dirac and von Neumann) to make these
predictions.
Classic theory represents events as subsets of a universal set called the
sample space. Quantum theory represents events as subspaces of universal
vector space called the Hilbert space. Technically, a Hilbert space is a vector
space defined on a complex field and endowed with an inner product that
satisfies completeness. The adoption of a vector space instead of a sample
space to represent events may be the most important assumption that is
made in the application of quantum theory to psychology.
Physicists work with both finite and infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces.
For example, an infinite dimensional space is used to represent the position
of a particle, but a finite n-dimensional space is used to represent the spin
of a particle. There is no a priori reason why a psychologist could not use
infinite dimensional spaces, but as in the field of quantum computing, almost
all of the previous work in quantum cognition has used finite dimensional
spaces. Choosing the dimensionality of the Hilbert space is critical first step
for constructing a quantum cognition model. The dimension depends on the
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number of variables and the number of values on each variable.
Two issues need to be considered when choosing the dimension of the
Hilbert space. The first issue is whether the measurements of a variable are
considered coarse (degenerate) or complete (non degenerate) (see, e.g., [25]).
The second issue arises when there are two or more variables and the question
is whether or not the variables should be combined to form what is called a
tensor product space.
First consider the issue of completeness. The measurement of a variable
is complete if the outcomes cannot be refined, and so each outcome can be
represented by a single ray or a single dimension. Consider an example such
as asking a juror to rate the probability of guilt on a five level scale (1 =
very low probability, 2 = moderately low probability, 3 = uncertain, 4 =
moderately high probability, 5 = very high probability). This variable is
measured by five mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes and so one
might wish to represent this variable by a 5 dimensional space. However, a
person may be capable of rating confidence on a much finer scale. Suppose
the finest scale is a 21 level scale (0 = certainly not guilty, 10, ..., 50 =
equally likely, 60, ..., 90, 100 = certain guilty). Then the 21 level scale
forms a complete measurement and requires a 21 dimensional space. If the
experimenter uses a 5 level scale, then this represents a coarse measurement
defined within a higher 21 dimensional space (e.g., levels 70 to 100 could be
mapped into category 5). In reality, we do not know how fine is the internal
scale of the human decision maker.
Next consider the tensor product space issue. Often in psychology ex-
periments, the participant is asked more than one question. Consider our
previous example of the categorization-decision experiment. In this study,
there are two variables: one is the categorization (categorize as good versus
bad) and the other is the action (choose between attack versus withdraw).
The problem is how to represent both variables within a single vector space.
The simplest possible representation is obtained by using the same two di-
mensional space to represent both variables. This is done by using a different
basis to represent each variable within the same two dimensional space. A
more complex representation is obtained by using a four dimensional space
that represents each combination of values for the two variables. The latter
is called a tensor product space.
How does one decide whether to represent the two variables within the
same space or to combine the variables into a tensor product state? The
tensor product representation assumes that it is possible for a person to
simultaneously consider the values of both variables at the same time. The
consideration of one value on one variable does not disturb the evaluation
of the second variable, and there should be no order effects when the two
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variables are simultaneously.2 If this simultaneous evaluation is not possible,
and the consideration of the value of one variable disturbs the evaluation
of the other variable, producing order effects, then the variables have to be
evaluated sequentially by changing the basis within a common space.
Ultimately, picking the dimension becomes an empirical question. This
must be done by balancing accuracy and parsimony. One starts with the
simplest model, and if that fails empirically, then one is forced to gradually
increase complexity. In [16] we initially tried the simplest 2 dimensional
space with different bases for each variable, but this failed empirically. Then
we tried the next simplest representation based a four dimensional (tensor
product) vector space, and this was empirically satisfactory.
2.2 Choosing a basis to construct projectors and ob-
servables
A basis is a set of orthormal basis vectors that span the Hilbert space. Once
we select a basis, we can construct a projector for the subpace represent-
ing an event by using its basis vectors. The projector for a subspace is
formed by the sum of the outer products of basis vectors that span the
subspace. Consider once again the categorization-decision task, and sup-
pose that the four orthonormal vectors (|GA〉 , |GW 〉 , |BA〉 , |BW 〉) form
the basis for the categorization. These four vectors can be represented nu-
merically by [1, 0, 0, 0]′ , [0, 1, 0, 0]′, [0, 0, 1, 0]′, [0, 0, 0, 1]′, respectively. If we
wish to measure the event “bad guy category” then we choose the ba-
sis vectors |BA〉 , |BW 〉 representing this category, and form the projector
CB = |BA〉 〈BA| + |BW 〉 〈BW |, which numerically corresponds to the ma-
trix diag [0, 0, 1, 1] . Likewise we can define the projector for the “good guy”
category using the basis vectors |GA〉 , |GW 〉 , and numerically this projector
corresponds to the matrix diag[1, 1, 0, 0]. If a set of projectors are pairwise
orthogonal and sum to the identity, then it forms a complete set that rep-
resents a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of events. In this example,
the two projectors are orthogonal, CGCB = 0, and they sum to the identity,
CG + CB = I, and so they form a complete set.
Using the projectors of a complete set, we can form an observable by
assigning a real number to each projector. For example, suppose we assign
+1 to the “bad guy” event and −1 to the “good guy” event; then the ob-
servable for the categorization variable is defined as C = (−1) · CG + (+1) ·
CB = CB − CG. This observable is constructed from the four categorization
2Simultaneity is important condition, because if a unitary transformation occurs in
between the measurements, then order effects can occur.
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(|GA〉 , |GW 〉 , |BA〉 , |BW 〉) basis vectors. These four basis vectors are eigen-
vectors of this observable because each one satisfies the eigenvector equation,
for example C |BW 〉 = (+1) · |BW 〉. The same eigenvalue (+1) is assigned
to both eigenvectors |BA〉 , |BW 〉. A repreated eigenvalue like this is called a
degenerate eigenvalue – any linear combination of eigenvectors |BA〉 , |BW 〉,
which share the same (+1) eigenvalue is also an eigenvector of C with the
same (+1) eigenvalue. A degenerate eigenvalue implies that the observation
of that value is a coarse measurement because there is more than one basis
vector associated with that value.
There is, however, an infinite number of choices for the basis. Different
questions might require a different choice of basis to represent the answers.
Consider once again the categorization decision task described earlier. One
basis could be used to judge the strength of evidence favoring each category
(good versus bad categories), but a different basis may be needed to evaluate
the consequences of actions (attack versus withdraw actions). In the above
example, the unitary operator UDC was used to change the basis from the
one used for categorization to the one used for action. The new basis for the
action decision is (UDC |GA〉 , UDC |GW 〉 , UDC |BA〉 , UDC |BW 〉). Then the
projector for the “attack action” isDA = UDC (|GA〉 〈GA|+ |BA〉 〈BA|)U
†
DC .
Likewise the projector for the “withdraw” action is DW = (I −DA). If we
assign −1 to the “withdraw” action and +1 to the “attack” action, then the
observable is D = DA−DW . Note that the observable for the action does not
commute with the observable for the categorization because the commutator
DC − CD 6= 0 does not equal zero.
The most difficult task is determing the form of the unitary operator,
UDC , used to change the basis. A completely general form for a unitary
operator to a basis Y = |Yi〉 , i = 1, N from another basis X is UY X =∑
j |Yj〉 〈Xj|, but this does not give much guidance. One general way to
construct a unitary matrix is to use the exponential function of the operator
H , UDC = exp (−iH), where H is a self adjoint linear operator
(
H = H†
)
called the Hamiltonian. Any unitary operator can be formed in this manner.
Using this method, the problem then becomes one of choosing the form of
the Hamiltonian. In [16], we designed a specific Hamiltonian based on the
rewards and punishments of the categorization - decision task.
If we present different faces but ask the same questions about categories
and actions for each face, then the same observables C,D can be applied to
each face. Thus, according to this interpretation, the observable only depends
on the question and it does not depend on the stimulus. We should point
out, however, that the separation between state preparation and selection of
the observable is not always clear cut, and one could argue that they can’t be
separated, so there are alternative viewpoints on this issue that we discuss
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later.
2.3 Preparing states
In quantum theory, the system under investigation is represented as a unit
length vector, |ψ〉, in the Hilbert space. In physics the system often refers
to a particle, but in psychology the system usually refers to a person. The
state vector |ψ〉 can be expressed as a linear combination of the basis vectors
and the coordinates of the state vector with respect to a basis are called
the amplitudes. For example, referring back to the categorization - decision
task, if we choose the categorization basis, then the state vector is defined
by |ψ〉 = ψGA |GA〉 + ψGW |GW 〉 + ψBA |BA〉 + ψBW |BW 〉, and ψGW is for
example the amplitude assigned to |GW 〉. Generally, these amplitudes can
be complex numbers and the sum of the squared magnitudes equals one. The
interpretation of these complex numbers is difficult for many psychologists,
but there is no a priori reason for limiting psychological applications to real
numbers, just as there is no reason to limit electrical engineering applications
to real numbers. In fact, Fourier analysis, using the complex transform, is
commonly used in both electrical control engineering, neural signal process-
ing, and human psychophysics. Utlimately the answers that we obtain and
need to interpet are always real.
In physics, the experiment begins with some physical system in some
state and then the experimenter prepares the state of the system by apply-
ing physical devices before testing begins. Different types of physical tests
can be performed on systems after they are prepared in the same state. In
psychology, the person begins with some state, and then the experimenter
manipulates the state of the person by presenting information or a stimu-
lus prior to questioning. In our categorization - decision experiment, the
participant is presented a new face on each trial, and the experimenter asks
questions about the category and the action to take for that face. Differ-
ent types of questions (which category, which action) can be asked about
the same face. Therefore the state before questioning is conditioned on the
stimulus, |ψf 〉, where f indicates that the person was shown a face labeled
f before asking any questions. Thus, according to this interpretation, the
presentation of a stimulus in a psychology experiment corresponds to state
preparation in a physics experiment and the state (before the question) does
not depend on the question that is asked later. Any question can be asked
from this state, and the probability of answers will vary across questions for
the same state. Once again we should point out that this separation between
state preparation and selection of the observable is debatable, and later we
consider are alternative viewpoints on this issue.
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There are two different ways to prepare the state in quantum physics.
One is by a measurement that projects the state to a subspace followed
by normalization to unit length. The other is by application of a unitary
operator that “rotates” the state in the Hilbert space while maintaining unit
length. Both of these methods could be used in a psychology experiment.
The stimulus information that the participant experiences changes the
state of the person. For example, in the categorization-decision experiment,
the face that is presented at the beginning of a trial will influence the state
of the person before making a categorization. For example, if the face looks
like a “bad guy” the state will move toward the subspace for that category.
There are various ways that this change could happen. One way is to use a
unitary operator Uf that depends on the face stimulus. If the initial state,
before the face is presented, is define as |ψI〉, then the state after presentation
of the face becomes |ψf 〉 = Uf |ψI〉.
3
The experimenter could present the participant some facts, which if ac-
cepted to be true, would cause the person’s state to be projected onto the
subspace consistent with those facts, and normalized to have unit length. For
example, in the categorization - decision experiment, the participant could
be informed that the face actually belongs to the “bad guy” category be-
fore being asked to make an action decision. Define |ψf 〉 as the state after
seeing the face but before any information is presented on a trial. After
the new category information is presented, the state is updated to become
|ψB〉 = (1/c) · CB |ψf〉 , c = ‖CB |ψf 〉‖ and then the decision to attack is
based on this updated state.
2.4 Computing probabilities and updating states
The purpose of using quantum theory for both physicists and psychologists
is to predict the probability of events. For a given state, the probability of
an event is obtained by projecting the state vector onto the subspace for
the event and computing is squared length. For example, referring again to
the categorization - decision study, if the person sees a face and is asked to
categorize it, then the probability of “bad guy” equals p(B|f) = ‖CB |ψf 〉‖
2.
In physics, the state of the system changes following a measurement. The
same process occurs in psychology – asking a question and deciding on a
definite answer changes the state of the person. According to Lder’s rule,
if the person categorizes the face as a “bad guy,” then the new state equals
3To be more precise, we should use the notation |ψI,f 〉 = Uf |ψI〉, because the trans-
formed state also depends on the initial state. But to avoid using too many subscripts,
and keeping in mind the history, hereafter we use the shorter notation.
11
|ψB〉 = (1/c) · CB |ψf〉 , c = ‖CB |ψf 〉‖. From this it follows that the prob-
ability of categorizing as a “bad guy” and then deciding to “attack” equals
p(B,A|f) =‖DA · |ψB〉‖
2 · ‖CB · |ψf〉‖
2 = ‖DA · CB · |ψf〉‖
2 · At the very end
of the trial, with a categorization of “bad guy” and the decision to “at-
tack” for example, the final state becomes |ψAB〉 = (1/d) · DA |ψB〉, where
d = ‖DA |ψB〉‖.
2.5 Sequential effects
An important question that still needs to be addressed concerns the changes
in the state of the person from one trial to the next. For example, in the
categorization - decision paradigm, each trial begins with the presentation
of a face and ends with feedback about the correct category and action.
This trial structure is part of the instructions given to the participant at the
beginning of the experiment. In this way, the person is trained with feedback
on the probabilities of faces being assigned to categories and appropriate
actions. How can this change from learning by feedback be incoporated
into the system? There are many way to do this, but one way is to use
the feedback to update the Hamiltonians that are used to form the unitary
transformations. For example, in the category - decision making task, the
unitary matrix Uf in the transformation |ψf〉 = Uf |ψI〉 can be updated
through feedback about the category. Also the unitary matrix UDC that
changes the basis from categorization to decision can be updated based on
feedback about the correct action.
A separate question concerns possible carry over effects from answers
on one trial to the next trial. In other words, how does the final state at
the end of one trial, say |ψAB, t〉 after categorizing a face as a “bad guy”
and deciding to “attack”, evolve during the intertrial interval into the initial
state |ψI , t+ 1〉 before the face is presented for the next trial? Usually the
information accumulated on one trial is not relevant for the next trial, and the
participants are instructed to treat the trials separately and independently.
The intertrial interval separating trials is made clear to the participant and
sufficiently long to prepare for the next trial (e.g. a reasonable pause with a
blank screen). The state needs to be reset during this intertrial interval from
some final state (e.g., |ψAB, t〉) after the previous trial back to a common
neutral state |ψI , t+ 1〉 = |ψ0〉 before the next trial begins. To accomplish
this reset task, some unitary operation or projection is required to change
the state during the intertrial interval. This process is an important issue
but little is understood about it. By the way, the same issue arises with more
traditional cognitive models such as Markov models, and so the problem is
not unique to quantum models.
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In some experiments, however, the information accumulated during one
episode remains relevant for another episode and so both episodes together
form a trial. In this case, there is little or no intertrial interval separating
the episodes. If a person is shown a face and asked to categorize it with
respect to aggressivess, and the same face is continued to be shown but now
the person is asked to categorize it with respect to intelligence, and the trial
is defined by the pair of episodes, then the participant can connect these two
episodes together so that the state following the answer to the first question
(agressiveness) is carried over and used as the state for answering the second
question (intelligence). In other words, no unitary transform to reset the
system intervenes between the two questions. The experimental instructions
and conditions that determine whether the reset versus the carry over occurs
is an important matter for future research [26].
2.6 Positive operator value measures
So far we have limited our discussion to measurement defined as projectors
which satisfy DA = D
†
A = D
2
A. A more general type of measurement is
one that does not need to satisfy either of these two properties, and instead
only satisfies positivity and completeness properties, defined below. These
generalized measurements for what are called the positive operator value
measurements (POVM). As recommended in Khrennikov2010, [26], POVM’s
could be an important tool for psychologists who need to work with more
complex types of measurements. As an example, consider the linear operator
PAB = DACB, which is a measurement of the sequence of events “categorize
as bad guy” and then “attack.” If the projectors DA, CB commute, then
PAB defines the projector for the conjunction of these two events, which is
represented as the intersection of subspaces A,B. Of course, this implies no
order effects. If there are order effects, then the events DA, CB do not com-
mute and the conjunction (which is commutative) is not defined. For the
non commutative case, the linear operator PAB is not a projector, it does
not correspond to any single subspace, and it is not an event. Instead this
measurement operator represents a sequence of two events. There are three
other measurement operators for the other three sequences of events in this
task: PAG = DACG, PWB = DWCB, PWG = DWCG. Note that P
†
ABPAB
is a positive operator because
〈
ψ|P †ABPAB|ψ
〉
≥ 0 for all |ψ〉, and the sum
P †ABPAB+P
†
AGPAG+P
†
WBPWB+P
†
WGPWG = I satisfies completeness. (Tech-
nically, PAB is the measurement operator and P
†
ABPAB is the positive operator
corresponding to this measurement). These two properties guarantee that
the probabilities of these four mutully exclusive and exhaustive sequences to
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sum to unity. Positivity and completeness are the two requirements needed to
define a complete set of positive operator valued measurements (POVM’s).
The four measurement operators provide one way to model sequences of
events when there is order dependence. A more general way to model con-
junctions of events in psychology using a POVM formulation was recently
proposed by [27]. Applications of POVMs to the problems of decision making
in the framework of theory of open quantum systems were considered in [28].
General discussion on a possibility to describe cognitive phenomena solely
by using only observables represented by Hermitian operators can found in
[29]. Here it was shown that some statistical data from cognitive psychology
cannot be represented with the aid of Hermitian operators; one has to use
POVMs and even their generalizations.
2.7 Constructing mixed states
The state vector |ψ〉 is called a pure state. This pure state can also be
expressed as a density operator ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| and then the probability of an
event, such as to categorize a face as “bad guy,” is given by the rule p(CB) =
tr[CB · ρ], which is equivalent to the previously defined rule. However, this
representation of state allows one to define a more general mixture state
ρ =
∑
pj |ψj〉 〈ψj | , 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1,
∑
pj = 1, and apply the same rule for
computing probabilities from densities. The advantage of using the density
operator is that this more general form can be used to represent a probability
obtained from a mixture of participants, where each participant is represented
by a different pure state [28]. One complicating factor that arises when
working mixed states is that their decomposition is not unique. Given a
particular mixed density operator, there is an infinite number of ways to
decompose it into pure states. This is not necessarily bad because mixed
states provide a more general way to represent uncertainty.
3 Alternative interpretations
4
3.1 Quantum - cognition system
We have presented one view of the mapping of psychological concepts into
quantum concepts. Let us briefly summarize them more formally. First we
choose the dimension N of the Hilbert space. The stimulus that is presented
4This comparison was inspired by working together on [26], as well as [30]
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to the participant (e.g., stimulus f) along with other experimental informa-
tion prepares the state |ψf 〉. A specific question (is the face to be presented a
“bad guy?”, is it “handsome,?” “does the person look intelligent?,” “should
you attack this face?,” or whatever question you wish) determines the basis
for the Hilbert space. The basis vectors are used to define the projectors
(e.g., DA, DW ), and a linear combination of the projectors forms the observ-
able (e.g. observable D). Let us call this the “quantum cognition” system
[2]. Now we consider some alternative systems that have been proposed.
3.2 Stimulus-response system
Another approach, called the Stimulus-Response system, does not assume
that the stimulus changes the state. Instead the state only depends on the
individual |ψI〉 (see, e.g., [26]) . The stimulus and question together define
the observable D(f) . Consider again the categorization-decision task in
which the person sees a face and then decides an action. Before any face or
other stimulus information is presented, the person is in the initial state |ψI〉.
The face stimulus together with the decision determine the observable D(f).
Actually this mapping turns out not to be very different than the quantum
cognition mapping. Starting from the quantum cognition system, we have
p(A|f) = ‖DA · |ψf 〉‖
2
= ‖DA · Uf · |ψI〉‖
2
∥∥∥(U †f ·DA · Uf) · |ψI〉∥∥∥2
= ‖DA(f) · |ψI〉‖
2
which is the stimulus response system with DA (f) = U
†·
f DA · Uf . In this
way, the stimulus-response system is a generalization of quantum cognition
system; alternatively, the quantum cognition system unpacks and breaks the
general function of the stimulus - response system down into its cognitive
components. This difference between the two systems corresponds to the
difference between the Heisenberg and Schrdinger pictures for a quantum
system.
3.3 State Context Property system
Aerts and Gabora and colleagues apply slightly different rules, which they call
the State Context Property or SCoP system [29]. They frequently work with
conceptual combination problems. For example, a person may be informed
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that they will be considering the concept of say “pet insect.” They are shown
an example, such as a spider, and then they are asked to decide whether or not
the example is a member of the concept “pet insect.” When asked to consider
a concept, like a pet, the person starts in a “ground” state for the pet concept
denoted |ψP 〉. When asked to consider the concept of pet in the context of
it being an insect “is this a pet insect”, the ground state is projected onto
the subspace for this insect context to produce a new state |ψPI〉. The
experimenter then asks a question: is this example spider a member of the
category pet insect? The pet insect state is then defined as a superposition
with regard to the example, i.e., superimposed about whether or not a spider
is a member of pet insect. The yes, no answers to the membership question
correspond to the projectorsMY ,MN = (I −MY ), respectively, and together
they determine the membership observable M = 1 ·My + 0 ·Mn. The same
membership observable M is used for all membership questions regardless of
the examples that are presented. If the example is changed from spider to
beetle, then the same observable M is applied to this new question.
Now we apply the SCoP system to the categorization - decision task
following [11]. We can define the ground state |ψU〉, as the concept “do
I want to attack this face?” when the category is unknown or undecided.
When placed into the context “this is a good guy” the state changes to
|ψG〉, but when placed into the context “this is a bad guy” the state changes
instead to |ψB〉. The observable M represents (yes,no), which is applied to
all three of these states to determine the probability of “attack.” In [11], a
simple 3 dimensional model was used to work out a SCoP model in detail.
In this simple 3-dimensional model, the states |ψG〉,|ψB〉 were designed to be
orthogonal, and the unknown state |ψU〉 =
1√
2
(|ψG〉+ |ψB〉) was assumed to
be a superposition of the two known states.
SCoP sometimes works differently than the quantum cognition system
and the stimulus response system. If we applied the quantum cognition
system to the conceptual combination problem, then the person’s state |ψs〉
is prepared by the example “spider,” which is the stimulus that is displayed
to the person The person knows that he or she is dealing with a spider, and
this is not uncertain. What is uncertain is whether or not it is a pet, or
more speficifically, whether or not it is a pet insect. The question “is this
a pet” is represented by one observable MP , and the question “is this an
insect” is represented by another observable MI . Likewise, the stimulus-
response system would form the observable M(s, P ) from the combination
of the stimulus (spider) and question (is this a pet?).
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3.4 Comparison
Let’s see how these systems work with a different example. (This section
is related to issues recently brought up by [30].) Quantum theory has been
successfully applied to question order effects in attitude surveys [24]. Sup-
pose a person is asked to judge whether or not a political administrator (yet
to be presented) is honest and trustworthy. For half of the respondents, the
picture and name of one administrator (e.g, Clinton) is shown first and a
judgment is made, and this followed by the picture and name of another
administrator (e.g., Gore) and another judgment is made; for the other half
of the respondants, the pictures and names are shown in the opposite order.
These questions form two related episodes, answers to one are relevant for
answering the other, and they are asked back to back with little or no time
interval between questions, and so they can be treated as one trial. Com-
pletely unrelated types of questions are presented on other trials.5 For these
closely related type of trials with back to back measurements, large order
effects are observed with all sorts of attitude questions. Consider the prob-
ability of saying “yes” to the Clinton question and then “yes” to the Gore
question.
Using the stimulus-response approach, we define Cy as the projector for
the answer “yes Clinton is honest and trustworty” to the Clinton stimulus,
and we define Gy as the projector for the answer “yes Gore is honest and
trustworty” to the Gore stimulus. Using the stimulus response approach
we obtain the result p(Cy,Gy) = ‖GyCy |ψI〉‖
2. Now suppose we define
the projectors as follows Cy = UCIMyU
†
CI , Gy = UGIMyU
†
GI where My is
the generic projector for “yes he is honest and trustworthy” applicable to
any person, UCI , UGI are a unitary operators. The projector UCIMyU
†
CI
represents the idea that we are examining the issue of honest and trustworthy
from the Clinton perspective. Alternatively UGIMyU
†
GI represents the same
question but now from the Gore perspective.
Now we show that the predictions from the quantum cognition system
agree with those from the stimulus - rsponse system for this example. The
stimulus-response system expresses the probability as (see Appendix for more
5(This is the actual procedure for some of the surveys examing order effects, see [4]).
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details)
p(Cy,Gy) =
∥∥∥(UGIMyU †GI)(UCIMyU †CI) |ψI〉∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥MyU †GCMyU †CI |ψI〉∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥(UGCMyU †GC)My (U †CI |ψI〉)∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥(U †GCMyU †GC)My |ψC〉∥∥∥2 ,
where U †GC = U
†
GIUCI and |ψC〉 = U
†
CI |ψI〉 and we made use of the length
preserving property of unitary operators. The latter expression is the result
obtained from the quantum cognition approach – the initial state (before
the first stimulus) is unitarily transformed by the Clinton stimulus, then the
projector for the question “yes he is honest and trustworthy” is applied, and
then the resulting state is unitarily transformed by the Gore stimulus, and
then the projector for “yes he is honest and trustworthy” is reapplied to the
new state.
In closing, it remains an empirical question whether one system will ulti-
mately provide a better representation for psychological studies as compared
to another. The field is too new and we need to be in an exploratoy mode.
All three systems need to be investigated in a more competitive way to see
which one evolves and survives to become most successful.
4 Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to analyze the sequence of projections(
UGNMyU
†
GN
)(
UCNMyU
†
CN
)
|ψ0〉 .
Suppose the Hilbert space is N - dimensional. We will focuse on the use
of three different bases for spanning this space. One is the “neutral” basis
{|Ni〉 , i = 1, N} used to represent the question “is the person honest and
trustworthy” for any person, which is used in the quantum cognition system.
The other two {|Ci〉 , i = 1, N}, {|Gi〉 , i = 1, N} are used to represent the
“Clinton/Gore questions about honest and trustworthy used in the stimulus
- response system.
Define UCN =
∑
k |Ck〉 〈Nk| as the unitary operator used to change from
the neutral to the Clinton basis; UGN =
∑
k |Gk〉 〈Nk| changs from the neutral
to the Gore basis, and it follows that
UGC = UGNU
†
CN
18
=(∑
j
|Gj〉 〈Nj |
)(∑
j
|Nj〉 〈Cj|
)
=
∑
i,j
|Gi〉 〈Ni| · |Nj〉 〈Cj|
=
∑
k
|Gk〉 〈Ck|
changes to from the Gore to the Clinton basis.
When expressed in terms of either the neutral or Clinton basis, the N×N
matrix for UCN equals VCN = [〈Nj|Ci〉] , (transition to row j from column i),
with
〈Nj|Ci〉 = 〈Nj|
∑
k
|Ck〉 〈Nk| · |Ni〉
= 〈Cj |
∑
k
|Ck〉 〈Nk| · |Ci〉
= 〈Nj |Ci〉 .
Note that V †CN = 〈Cj|Ni〉 . Likewise, when expressed in terms of the either
the neutral or Gore basis, the N×N matrix for UGN equals VGN = [〈Nj|Gi〉],
and V †GN = 〈Gj |Ni〉 . When expressed in terms of the either the Clinton or
Gore basis, the N × N matrix for UGC equals VGC = V
†
CNVGN = [〈Cj|Gi〉] ,
and note that the matrix for U †GC equals V
†
GC = V
†
GNVCN = [〈Gj|Ci〉] .
Define the initial state, at the trial beginning and before any stimulus is
presented, as |ψ0〉 =
∑
i |Ni〉 〈Ni|ψ0〉 =
∑
i |Ci〉 〈Ci|ψ0〉 =
∑
i |Gi〉 〈Gi|ψ0〉 and
‖|ψ0〉‖
2 = 1.When expressed in terms of the neutral basis, the N × 1 matrix
of coordinates equals VN(0) = [〈Ni|ψ0〉], when expressed in terms of the
Clinton basis, the N × 1 matrix of coordinates equals VC(0) = [〈Ci|ψ0〉], and
when expressed in terms of the Gore basis, the N × 1 matrix of coordinates
equals VG(0) = [〈Gi|ψ0〉].
Finally, we define the projector for the answer “yes” to the question “is
the person honest and trustworthy” for any person. This is defined in terms
of the neutral basis as My =
∑
j∈yes |Nj〉 〈Nj| . When expressed in terms
of the neutral basis, this equals an N × N indicator matrix Wy = [wji],
wji = 〈Nj |My|Ni〉 with ones on the diagonal corresponding to yes, and zero
otherwise.
We start by analyzing the first the Clinton question
(
UCNMyU
†
CN
)
|ψ0〉.
First, we obtain
U †CN |ψ0〉
=
∑
k
|Nk〉 〈Ck| ·
∑
j
|Nj〉 〈Nj |ψ0〉
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=
∑
k
|Nk〉
∑
j
〈Ck|Nj〉 〈Nj |ψ0〉 .
This corresponds to the matrix product V †CN · VN . Second, we apply the
measurement to obtain
MyU
†
CN |ψ0〉 =∑
k∈yes
|Nk〉 〈Nk| ·
∑
j
|Nj〉
∑
i
〈Cj|Ni〉 〈Ni|ψ0〉
=
∑
k∈yes
|Nk〉
∑
j
〈Ck|Nj〉 〈Nj |ψ0〉
, which corresponds to the matrix Wy · V
†
CN · VN(0). Third, we apply the
last unitary operator to obtain the projection |ψ1〉 =
(
UCNMyU
†
CN
)
|ψ0〉=∑
k |Ck〉 〈Nk|·
∑
k∈yes |Nk〉
∑
j 〈Ck|Nj〉 〈Nj |ψ0〉=
∑
k∈yes |Ck〉
∑
j 〈Ck|Nj〉 〈Nj|ψ0〉.
This corresponds to the matrix product VC(1) =
(
VCN ·Wy · V
†
CN
)
· VN(0).
Using the fact that 〈Cj |ψ0〉 =
∑
j 〈Ck|Nj〉 〈Nj |ψ0〉 the result of the first mea-
surement can be expressed as |ψ1〉 =
∑
k∈yes |Ck〉 〈Cj|ψ0〉. The probability of
yes to the first question equals the squared length ‖|ψ1〉‖
2 = V †C(1)VC(1) ≤ 1.
(Notice that we have not normalized this projection).
Hereafter, we operate on the projection |ψ1〉 =
∑
k∈yes |Ck〉 〈Cj|ψ0〉 =∑
k∈yes |Ck〉
∑
j 〈Ck|Nj〉 〈Nj|ψ0〉. This projection can be also be expressed in
the Gore basis as |ψ1〉 =
∑
k |Gk〉 〈Gk|ψ1〉. It’s matrix representation equals
VC(1) =
(
VCN ·Wy · V
†
CN
)
· VN(0).
Now we repeat these operations for the Gore question
(
UGNMyU
†
GN
)
|ψ1〉.
First, we obtain U †GN |ψ1〉=
∑
k |Nk〉 〈Gk|·
∑
j |Gj〉 〈Gj|ψ1〉=
∑
k |Nk〉·
∑
k 〈Gk|ψ1〉.
This corresponds to the matrix product V †GN ·VC(1) = V
†
GN ·
(
VCN ·Wy · V
†
CN
)
·
VN(0). Then we apply the measurement to obtainMyU
†
GN |ψ1〉 =
∑
k∈yes |Nk〉 〈Nk|·∑
j |Nj〉 〈Gj |ψ1〉 =
∑
k∈yes |Nk〉 〈Gk|ψ1〉 which corresponds to the matrixWy ·
V †GN · VCN · Wy · V
†
CN · VN(0). Then we apply the last unitary operator to
obtain the second projecton |ψ2〉 =
(
UGNMyU
†
GN
)
|ψ1〉=
∑
k |Gk〉 〈Nk| ·∑
j∈yes |Nj〉 〈Gj|ψ1〉 =
∑
k∈yes |Gk〉 · 〈Gk|ψ1〉 . This corresponds to the ma-
trix product VG(2) =
(
VGN ·Wy · V
†
GN
)(
VCN ·Wy · V
†
CN
)
· VN(0). The fi-
nal probability of yes to the first and then the second question equals the
squared length of the second projection ‖|ψ2〉‖
2 = V †G(2)VG(2) ≤ ‖|ψ1〉‖
2 =
V †C(1)VC(1) ≤ 1.
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In sum, using the convenient matrix representation, we find that the
answer from the stimulus response system equals∥∥∥(VGN ·Wy · V †GN)(VCN ·Wy · V †CN) · VN(0)∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥Wy · V †GC ·Wy · V †CN · VN(0)∥∥∥2 ,
where the effect of VGN in the last step is ignored because it does not change
length. The latter expression describes the same answer in terms of the
quantum cognition system: First, the initial state VN (0), before any stimulus,
is changed by a unitary matrix to the state
(
V †CN · VN(0)
)
based on the
information provided by the stimulus. Second, a measurement is taken using
the general measurement matrix Wy that does not depend on any stimulus.
Third the state is changed again by the unitary matrix V †GC that depends
on the second stimulus. Finally, the second measurement is taken using the
same general measurement matrix.
References
[1] Khrennikov A (2010) Ubiquitous quantum structure: From psychology
to finance. Springer.
[2] Busemeyer J R, Bruza P D (2012) Quantum models of cognition and
decision. it Cambridge University Press
[3] Pothos E M, Busemeyer J R (2013) Can quantum probability provide
a new direction for cognitive modeling? Behavioral Brain Sciences,
36:255-327
[4] Wang Z, Busemeyer J R, Atmanspacher H, Pothos E M (2013). The
potential of using quantum theory to build models of cognition. it Topics
in Cognitive Science, 5:689-710.
[5] Aerts D, Aerts S (1994) Applications of quantum statistics psychological
studies of decision processes. Foundations of Physics 1:85-97
[6] Atmanspacher H, Romer, H, Walach, H (2002) Weak quantum theory:
complementarity in physics and beyond. Foundations of Physics 32:379-
406.
21
[7] Bordely, R F (1998) Quantum mechanical and human violations of com-
pound probability principles: toward a generalized Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle. Operations Research 46:923-926.
[8] Khrennikov A Y (1999) Classical and quantum mechanics on informa-
tion spaces with applications to cognitive, psychological, social, and
anomolous phenomena. Foundations of Physics 29:1065-1098.
[9] Pothos E M, Busemeyer J R (2009) A quantum probability explana-
tion for violations of rational decision making Proceedings of the Royal
Society B 276(1665):2171-2178.
[10] Busemeyer J R, Pothos E M, Franco R, Trueblood J S (2011) A quan-
tum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors Psycholog-
ical Review 118(2):193-218
[11] Aerts D (2009) Quantum structure in cognition Journal of Mathematical
Psychology 53(5):314-348
[12] Gabora L, Aerts D (2002) Contextualizing concept using a mathemat-
ical generalization of the quantum formalism Journal of Experimental
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14:327-358
[13] Blutner R, Pothos E M, Bruza P (2013). A quantum probability perspec-
tive on borderline vagueness. Topics in Cognition Science, 5:711-736.
[14] Trueblood J S, Busemeyer, J R (2011) A quantum probability model for
order effects on inference Cognitive Science 35(8):1518:1552
[15] Trueblood J S, Busemeyer J R (2012) A quantum probability model of
causal reasoning Frontiers in Cognition 2:article289
[16] Busemeyer J R, Wang Z, Mogiliansky-Lambert A (2009) Comparison of
quantum and Markov models of decision making Journal of Mathemat-
ical Psychology 53(5):423-433.
[17] Wang Z, Busemeyer, J R (2013) A quantum question order model sup-
ported by empirical tests of an a priori and precise prediction. Topics in
Cognitive Science, 5:689-710
[18] Conte E et al. (2009) Mental states follow quantum mechanics during
perception and cognition of ambiguous figures Open Systems and Infor-
mation Dynamics 16:1-17.
22
[19] Lambert-Mogiliansky A, Zamir S, Zwirn H (2009) Type indeterminacy:
a model of the K-T (Kahneman-Tversky)- man Journal of Mathematical
Psychology 53(5):349-361.
[20] La Mura P (2009) Projective expected utility Journal of Mathematical
Psychology 53(5):408-41
[21] Yukalov S, Sornette D (2011) Decision theory with prospect interference
and entanglement Theory and Decision 70:283-328
[22] Townsend, J. T., Silva, K. M., Spencer-Smith, J., & Wenger, M. (2000).
Exploring the relations between categorization and decision making with
regard to realistic face stimuli. Pragmatics and Cognition, 8, 83-105
[23] Busemeyer, J. R., Wang, Z., & Townsend, J. T. (2006). Quantum dy-
namics of human decision making. Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
50, 220241.
[24] Wang, Z , Solloway, T., Shifrin R. M., Busemeyer, J. R. (in press) Con-
text effects produced by question orders reveal quantum nature of human
judgments. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science.
[25] Peres, A. (1998) Quantum theory: Concepts and methods. Kluwer Aca-
demic.
[26] Khrennnikov, A., Basieva, I., Dzhafarov, E. N., Busemeyer, J. R. (2014)
Quantum models for psychological measurements: An unsolved prob-
lem. arXiv:1403.3654v1
[27] Miyadera, T., Phillips, T. (2012) Reformulating a Quantum Probability-
theoretic account of human judgment errors: an axiomatic approach.
Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society.
[28] Asano, M., Basieva, I., Khrennikov, A., Ohya, M., Yamato, I. (2013)
Non-Kolmogorovian approach to the context-dependent systems break-
ing the classical probability law. Foundations of physics. 43. 895-911.
[29] Khrennikov , A. (2009) A model of quantum-like decision-making with
applications to psychology and cognitive science. Biosystems, 95, 179-
187.
[28] Camparo, J. (2013) A geometical approach to the ordinal data of Likert
scaling and attitude measurements: The density matrix in psychology.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 57 (1) 29-42.
23
[29] Aerts, D., Gabora, L. (2005)A theory of concepts and their combinations
II: A Hilbert space representation. Kybernetics, 34,192-221.
[30] Dzhafarov, E., Atmanspacher, H. (2014) Quantum states and observ-
ables in psychological measurements. arXiv:1405.5389v1 21 May 2014
24
